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GROUNDING ORIGINALISM
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs
ABSTRACT—How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn”
in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation
of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual
practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of
originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the
Founding, plus all lawful changes made since.
Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions.
How can practice solve our problems, when there are so many theories of
law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official story, when
on-the-ground practice may be confused or divided—or may even make the
story ring false? And why take originalism as the official story, when so
many scholars and judges seem to reject it?
This Essay offers a response to each. To the extent that legal systems
are features of particular societies, a useful theory will have to pay attention
to actual social practice, including the aspects of legal practice we describe.
This positive focus really can resolve a great many contentious legal
disputes, as shared legal premises lead to conclusions that might surprise us
or that ultimately establish one side in a dispute as correct. The most serious
challenge to our view is the empirical one: whether originalism is or isn’t the
official story of our law. Stripped of their jurisprudential confusion, though,
the best competing accounts of our law seem to have far less supporting
evidence than our own account. Focusing on social practice as it stands today
turns out to direct our attention to the Founders and to the changes over time
that their law has recognized.
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INTRODUCTION
“What makes a method of legal interpretation correct?” 1 The question
is an urgent one. Americans disagree about their Constitution and about how
to interpret it. But perhaps we can make forward progress if we first push the
debate back a step or two. If people disagree about interpretation, and if they
make earnest arguments on either side, maybe they can still reach agreement
on something prior (and thus far neglected) 2: what might make their

1

Mark Greenberg, Response, What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal
Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 105, 105 (2017).
2 See Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1115, 1136 (2012) (decrying this neglect). One important exception is Christopher R. Green,
Constitutional Truthmakers, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 497 (2018). For others, see
Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325 (2018); Mitchell N. Berman
& Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 545 (2013); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV.
535 (1999); and David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996).
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arguments good arguments? What would make an interpretive method
correct?
Over the past several years, we’ve sought to articulate a view of
American law that responds to this question, as well as to specific
interpretive debates. That view contains three core claims.
1. Theories of legal interpretation ought to give more emphasis to
questions of law. 3 Whatever a theory’s conceptual elegance or normative
attractions, it also matters whether that theory already reflects our law or is
instead a call for law reform. What our law makes of a legal text is a legal
question, and it deserves a legal answer. That answer depends in part on
principles of abstract jurisprudence, which determine the law in general, and
in part on particular rules of our legal system, which determine the effect of
particular instruments (whether contracts, statutes, or constitutions). Those
particular rules might be legally binding, even if they’re not the best possible
rules. So our deepest disputes about interpretive theory, just like our disputes
about tax rates or drug policy, might turn out to have particular answers in
our legal system, even if the best answers remain a matter of dispute.
2. As it turns out, the particular rules of our legal system happen to
endorse a form of originalism. 4 Our law today incorporates our original law
by reference. Officially, we treat the Constitution as a piece of enacted law
that was adopted a long time ago; whatever law it made back then remains
the law, subject to various de jure alterations or amendments made since.5
And we identify modern law by way of this past law, the way a nemo dat
rule identifies today’s property holdings by way of yesterday’s transfers:
explaining how a legal rule enjoys good title today means explaining how it
lawfully arose out of the government established at the Founding. 6 This
“original-law originalism” 7 is broad and inclusive, in that it serves as a
criterion for the rest of our constitutional law, “including of the validity of
other methods of interpretation or decision.” 8
To be sure, government officials don’t always satisfy this criterion, any
more than ordinary citizens always comply with laws against murder or tax
3 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079
(2017). For a related view, see Mark Greenberg, Principles of Legal Interpretation 9, 17–20 (2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Principles-of-LegalInterpretation-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT75-NK4S].
4 We’ve also made analogous arguments about statutory interpretation, which we won’t rehearse at
length here. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1097–1118, 1121–28.
5 Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817,
849–52 (2015).
6 Id. at 846–47.
7 Id. at 874.
8 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355 (2015).
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evasion. But in conceding that—and in calling originalism the “official
story” of the legal system 9—we also don’t mean to portray it as a fable
recited at judicial campfires and then ignored when the real work gets done.
Rather, we think that our legal system reflects a deep commitment to our
original law, publicly displayed in our legal practice. Indeed, originalism
could aptly be called the “deep structure” of our constitutional law, present
in our frequent practices of identifying, justifying, and debating the content
of our law. 10
3. The binding force of our original law has important consequences for
the present day. In principle, the Founders’ law might have allowed for just
about anything. It might have endorsed many different methods of
interpretation or rules of legal change—from hyper-literal strict construction
to the “equity of the statute,” 11 from Article V amendments to evolving
bodies of customary law. But to claim that, in fact, our original law actually
permits or requires any of these things is to make an empirical and falsifiable
claim, one that has to be supported by historical evidence and not only by
modern policy preferences. The original-law approach may be capacious in
theory, but it’s “exacting in application.” 12
If we’re right about these three claims, much else follows. As a
theoretical matter, if the interpreter’s job is to ask what our law is (and to
leave to others what it should be), then many of our interpretive and
normative disputes are reframed. And as a practical matter, this
understanding of American constitutional law might turn out to support or to
undermine a wide variety of legal doctrines. 13
But not everybody agrees we’re right. Indeed, not everybody agrees
we’re even asking the right questions, or proceeding down the right track.
Some scholars worry that we’ve overrun our foundations—arguing that our
claims can’t be adjudicated until we first identify the proper theory of law,
because “prominent theories of law have extremely different implications for
legal interpretation.” 14 To others, our situation is even worse: we “achieve[]
9

Sachs, supra note 5, at 870.
Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice 27,
80 (Apr. 11, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/id=2940215 [https://perma.cc/PC2DTDWD].
11 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 995–96 (2001).
12 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103, 104 (2016).
13 See, e.g., id. at 107–08 (listing decisions whose legal pedigree is doubtful under original law
originalism); Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2017) (arguing,
naturally, that Pennoyer was right). See generally William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the
Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017) (defending modern doctrines of state sovereign immunity).
14 Greenberg, supra note 1, at 117–18.
10
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an air of novelty and plausibility only because [we’re] ambiguous, evasive,
or downright inconsistent about some of the deepest questions about the
nature of law,” and no theory of law can save us. 15 Any turn to positive law,
this argument goes, “puts judges and legal scholars right back where they
have always been,” 16 making no forward progress in resolving our
disagreements. And still others simply disagree with our reading of the
evidence, finding it unconvincing that originalism is the official story of
today’s law. 17
It’s true that at least some of our claims involve theoretical assumptions
about what law is and how it works. Thus far, we’ve generally worked from
the conventional assumption that “what counts as law in any society is
fundamentally a matter of social fact.”18 In our view, this positivist premise
fits within an overlapping consensus among American legal scholars, largely
centered on the theories of Professor H.L.A. Hart 19—a consensus that
appeals to the broadest possible audience without requiring too many
controversial assumptions. (We also think it has the further virtue of being
true.) But we haven’t yet attempted to defend positivism writ large or to rest
our theory on any particular version thereof.
We offer three arguments here that we hope will show that our theory
is as grounded as it needs to be.20 First, we argue that one can make real
progress in legal interpretation by looking to legal practice, without first
resolving many difficult jurisprudential questions. Second, we argue that this
kind of positive focus can in fact resolve a great many contentious legal
disputes. Rather than leaving legal disputants “where they have always
been,” 21 our shared practice often reveals shared legal premises that lead to
surprising results or that ultimately establish one side in a dispute as correct.
Third, we argue that the most serious challenge to our view ought to be an
empirical one: whether originalism is or isn’t the official story of our law.
Stripped of their jurisprudential confusions, the challenges to our empirical
15

Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1330, 1342 (2017).
Id. at 1387.
17 See infra Part III.
18 Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S
POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355, 356 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
19 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012); see also infra Section II.A (describing
Hart’s theory); cf. Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1298 n.23
(2014) (describing “Hart’s version of legal positivism” as “the most influential position in contemporary
philosophy of law”).
20 We use the term “ground” for its colloquial meaning, rather than in any technical sense. See, e.g.,
Ricki Bliss & Kelly Trogdon, Metaphysical Grounding, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/grounding
[https://perma.cc/S9DN-CN58] (discussing the technical notion of grounding).
21 Barzun, supra note 15, at 1387.
16
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claims remain weak. Many lawyers might find themselves surprised to be
committed to originalist premises, the way Molière’s M. Jourdain was
amazed to discover that he had spent his whole life speaking prose. Yet
competing accounts of the law prove to be even harder to swallow.
The result, we hope, is a straightforward grounding of originalism as
our law—then and now.
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Interpretive theory doesn’t live in a vacuum. To paraphrase Professor
Mark Greenberg, “an account of legal interpretation” ought to be
“responsible to a theory of law.” 22 Interpreting a legal text is just one part of
how we identify the law in general. And identifying the law, in our view,
means looking to actual legal practice.
The legal content of a particular text—its contribution to the legal
system, to use Greenberg’s term23—can depend not only on its linguistic
content but also on existing legal rules. 24 A statute creating a new criminal
offense, for example, might be understood and interpreted according to a
variety of special-purpose rules, such as the Dictionary Act, 25 the repealrevival statute, 26 or the mens rea canon. 27 These legal rules can guide the
interpretation of a legal text that “outranks” them: old statutes help determine
the effect of new ones, and common law doctrines help determine the content
of statutes. 28
The same interpretive issues arise for constitutions, and the same kinds
of rules can help solve them. Does an amendment repealing Prohibition abate
pending bootlegging prosecutions? Unwritten legal rules tell us that the
answer is yes. 29 And similar rules can tell us, for instance, the “burden of
proof for constitutional questions,” “the authority of constitutional
precedents,” and even which scraps of text form part of our authoritative
constitutional document. 30 The substance of our interpretive rules may differ
22

Greenberg, supra note 3, at 9.
Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic
Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 219 (Andrei Marmor
& Scott Soames eds., 2011).
24 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1082.
25 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
26 Id. § 108.
27 See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 574–75 (2009).
28 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1097–99.
29 See id. at 1118–20 (discussing United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 221–22 (1934)).
30 Id. at 1120; see also John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 375, 429–51 (2001) (arguing that the validity of the Fourteenth Amendment relies, in part, on the
de facto government doctrine).
23
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for statutes and for constitutions, 31 but they’re the same kinds of rules,
answering the same kinds of questions. Even if one accepts no other part of
our project, we believe these claims are both useful and correct, supported
by well-recognized features of modern law.
The most fundamental challenge to our project disputes the usefulness
of even these claims. Greenberg, for example, agrees that “what makes a
method of legal interpretation correct is that it accurately identifies the
law.” 32 But he sees it as a mistake to analogize such methods too closely to
particular legal standards like the mens rea canon, because the “answers to
questions about legal interpretation depend,” in the final accounting, “on
how the content of the law is determined at a more fundamental level than
legal standards.” 33 The mens rea canon is only law because something else
makes it so. Because intermediate standards like these play only “a
subsidiary role in the full explanation of how the content of the law is
determined,” focusing the interpretive inquiry on them “only pushes back a
step the core question of how the more basic facts determine legal
standards.” 34
Yet pushing questions back a step can still be useful. If one wants to
know how plants grow, it’s often best to defer questions about fundamental
determinants (like particle physics or quantum mechanics) and to work at the
intermediate level of proteins and enzymes instead. That’s because proteins
and enzymes are the means by which the fundamental determinants go about
determining things; learning about them tells us something that’s useful to
know, even when we’re mistaken on the fundamentals. Scientists learned a
great deal about macro-scale chemistry while working from incorrect beliefs
about “phlogiston” and “dephlogisticated air,” and what they learned still
proved relevant after the identification of oxygen. 35
Likewise, theorists who disagree about deep theory might well make
substantial progress in legal interpretation by working at the intermediate
level of canons or common law rules. Many arguments over the role of
legislative history in interpreting statutes have direct analogues to the use of
extrinsic evidence in interpreting contracts. 36 It seems to be common ground
31

Cf. M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (denying that the Constitution can
“partake of the prolixity of a legal code”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 565–66 (2003) (noting that different Founding-era rules of construction applied to
different types of documents).
32 Greenberg, supra note 1, at 106.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See Leslie V. Woodcock, Phlogiston Theory and Chemical Revolutions, 30 BULL. FOR HIST.
CHEM. 63, 64–65 (2005).
36 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1112–14.
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that the latter question can be regulated by law; 37 so why shouldn’t we
investigate the former as a legal question, too, and see what, if anything, the
legal system has to say about it? Without having solved jurisprudence, we
can enjoy some degree of confidence that a new criminal statute will require
mens rea, that it will be subject to defenses like duress or diplomatic
immunity, and so on—whether or not individual members of the enacting
Congress actually adverted to these issues, and whether or not the statutory
text has any linguistic connection to these more detailed rules. The same goes
for less obvious but still familiar aspects of our legal experience: say, that
Congress is presumed (contrary to fact) to understand the entire corpus
juris, 38 that legal texts can be meaningful even when their actual authors
failed to agree, 39 and so on. We can have confidence that our legal system
involves some degree of idealization in assessing communicative intent,
without either rejecting strict intentionalism as a theory of meaning or having
already established the fundamental determinants of law.40 And if these
aspects of interpretation appear to be law-governed, that gives us reason to
ask whether yet broader issues—textualism and purposivism, originalism
and common law constitutionalism, and so on—might be law-governed as
well.
Now maybe all this confidence is misplaced. Greenberg argues that we
can’t bracket disagreements over the fundamentals, even temporarily:
different theories of law could have “extremely different implications” for
interpretation, 41 and one can’t assume that “whatever contemporary lawyers
do is, for that reason, correct.” 42 Yet a good theory of law ought to generate
most of the familiar aspects of the existing legal system, or else it ought to
be especially plausible in explaining why those familiar aspects are wrong.
All else being equal, a theory suggesting that arson is lawful but that
sandwiches are felonies would be a dubious theory of American law.
Of course, legal claims often being defeasible, it’s possible for these
confident assumptions to be wrong. Maybe the arson statute actually lapsed
long ago, due to a little-noticed sunset clause hiding someplace else in the
code. In that case, the statute book might really declare that arson isn’t a
felony after all, and a good legal theory might tell us so. But this discovery
37

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); id. § 213 cmt. a.
See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
39 Compare, e.g., Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539,
542 (2013) (holding such texts to be “gibberish”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 20,
201 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (occasionally giving them legal effect).
40 Contra Greenberg, supra note 1, at 121.
41 Id. at 117–19 (suggesting differences in “how much law of interpretation there is and [in] what it
requires”).
42 Id. at 121.
38
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would undermine our surface-level commitments about arson only because
we already share a deeper commitment about the statute book, reflecting our
legal system’s hierarchical structure. 43 Subject to those kinds of
qualifications, it seems hard to deny that doctrines like the repeal-revival rule
or the mens rea canon are part of American law—and that the burden is on
anyone who’d reject the application of similar doctrines to new legal texts.
For the same reason, if originalism or common law constitutionalism offers
the best account of our legal system’s deep structure, that strikes us as a
compelling argument in its favor.
Perhaps this is just another way of stating our positivist intuitions. The
thing to be explained strikes us as a feature of our society, and so it seems
fair to “[l]ook and see” what our society’s practices actually are.44 Indeed,
one needn’t be a positivist to see social practices as “crucial, even if they are
not sufficient,” in determining the law. 45 In any case, if someone wants to
argue that positivism is generally false, then they’re hunting for bigger game
than us. That American law reflects American legal practice, all else being
equal, is an assumption we’re willing to make. (That’s why we see the
surprising features of our own account as strikes against it, all else being
equal, and thus as needing further explanation.)
We’re also willing to make certain assumptions regarding the types of
positivism that might support the project. In our own work, we’ve adopted
the generally Hartian version of positivism, 46 described further below, 47 that
strikes us as the focal point among American law professors (to the extent
that they think about such theories at all). 48 It might turn out that the Hartian
account is generally wrong and that some contrary positivist theory—say,
that of Professor Joseph Raz or of Professor Scott Shapiro—is generally
right. 49 That, too, is bigger game; and to the extent that those theories are
truly general, capable of representing any positive legal system regardless of
its content, then they ought to be no less mindful of the social commitments
and interpretive practices we describe. (There could be Razian or
Shapironian versions of original-law originalism, the construction of which

43

See infra Part II.
Leslie Green, Introduction to HART, supra note 19, at xlv.
45 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 116 (2016);
see also Mikołaj Barczentewicz, The Limits of Natural Law Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
ONLINE 115, 124–25 (2018) (noting this argument by Pojanowski and Walsh).
46 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1116; see also HART, supra note 19 (setting forth this view).
47 See infra Section II.A.
48 See Greenberg, supra note 19, at 1298 n.23.
49 Cf. Barzun, supra note 15, at 1361–80 (discussing the theories of Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and
Morality, 68 MONIST 295 (1985), and SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011)).
44
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we leave as an exercise for the reader.50) For present purposes, we’re satisfied
to show that our account of the law is generally consistent with the mostaccepted theory of positivism. If we’re right about the theory and right about
the practice, then originalism is rather well-grounded indeed.
THEORY
To some, using practice to resolve real-life legal disputes is a fool’s
errand. Positivism grounds law in social practice and consensus, and if
people disagree, it seems that consensus has run short. According to
Professor Richard Primus, an argument for originalism “cannot simply
emerge from pointing to our present practices,” for the simple reason that
originalism “calls for those practices to change.” 51 As he argues, “[i]t is what
the Court has been doing that is our law, and a big part of what the Court has
been doing is deciding cases . . . in ways that are not consistent with original
meanings.” 52 More emphatically, to Professor Charles Barzun, “no defender
of any controversial theory of legal interpretation can appeal to Hartian
positivism for support,” for Hartian positivism requires a “consensus or nearconsensus” to ground any claim about law. 53 On this objection, if the official
story and official practice are at loggerheads, the story tells us nothing new
or useful about the law.
This kind of criticism moves too fast. Positivism might ground law on
social practice, but it doesn’t reduce law to social practice. On Hart’s own
account, some legal rules might reflect practice directly, but the vast majority
do so only indirectly, involving some degree of inference from practicesupported premises. 54 Individual results are derived from legal rules, which
are derived, in turn, from yet more fundamental legal rules—terminating, on
50 For example, Raz’s claim that social facts alone identify the “existence and content” of the law,
see Raz, supra note 49, at 296, is in no way inconsistent with those social facts cross-referring us in
certain ways to the law of the Founding, itself identified by yet more social facts. Barzun, improbably,
denies this, on the ground that the Founders might have wished to incorporate moral principles in their
law in a way that Raz’s “sources thesis” forbids. See Barzun, supra note 15, at 1364–66; Raz, supra note
49, at 315–16. Yet if Raz were correct, and this incorporation were conceptually impossible, then the
Founders necessarily failed in their efforts, and we’d have no difficulty incorporating the wholly sourcebased law that they did make. Different positivist theories might conceivably draw different legal
conclusions from the empirical claims described below, see infra Part III, but we’re not aware of any
detailed argument to this effect. Cf. Barzun, supra note 15, at 1374 (suggesting that we and Shapiro “make
more or less the same kind of argument”). In any case, though we’ve maintained that legal systems are
relatively immune to conceptual arguments about the nature of interpretation, see Sachs, supra note 5, at
834, we don’t maintain that they’re immune to conceptual arguments about their own nature—contra
Barzun, supra note 15, at 1365–66.
51 Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44, 51 (2016).
52 Id. at 51–52.
53 Barzun, supra note 15, at 1354, 1357 (citing Greenberg, supra note 1, at 115).
54 See infra text accompanying notes 70–73.
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Hart’s account, in an ultimate rule of recognition, the “complex, but normally
concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in
identifying the law by reference to certain criteria.” 55
This hierarchical structure makes it possible for the correct ground-level
legal rules to surprise us. 56 A legal system can tolerate frequent mistakes and
departures from the law, conflicting claims of legal authority, and even
universal misunderstandings of what the law happens to require. 57 As these
consequences illustrate, so long as we share certain kinds of premises, a
positivist approach can still reform our surface-level practices and resolve
apparent disagreements. In the same way, originalism can be a correct
descriptive account of our legal system, even if few people would currently
describe our system that way.
A. Rules and Inferences
Grounding legal rules on legal practice doesn’t rule out surprises. Legal
reasoning is an inferential process that can lead us to surprising results. For
example, a little time and patience with the statute books will reveal that it’s
unlawful to send by mail any fruit bats of the genus Pteropus; 58 that
astronauts launching from Cape Canaveral may not sell each other unlabeled
syrup mixtures or unbaled cotton; 59 and that there’s a fifty-square-mile swath
of Idaho in which one may commit felonies with impunity. 60 These can be
valid rules in our legal system although few legal officials (let alone ordinary
Americans) know about them or have specific practices along these lines.
At first glance, legal surprises like these might seem impossible. If law
is “a set of socially grounded norms,” 61 then there can’t be any legal norms
of which society isn’t aware. But that argument ignores the central
importance of legal reasoning, which can take us from familiar premises to
very surprising conclusions.
On Hart’s view, social rules are more than “regularities” that an external
observer might “record and predict.” 62 They’re things people “use,” from the
55

HART, supra note 19, at 110.
See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2253, 2256 (2014).
57 See infra Sections II.B–D.
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 1716D (2012) (cross-referencing 39 U.S.C. § 3015(a) (2012) (cross-referencing
18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1) (2012))).
59 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(6), 13(a) (2012); FLA. STAT. §§ 865.07–.08 (2018).
60 See Brian C. Kalt, The Perfect Crime, 93 GEO. L.J. 675, 677–78 (2005) (discussing U.S. CONST.
amend. VI and 28 U.S.C. § 131 (2000)).
61 Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices
Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 728 (2006).
62 HART, supra note 19, at 89, 98.
56
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“internal point of view,” as “standards for the appraisal of their own and
others’ behaviour.” 63 A violation of the rules is not only criticized—using
terms like “‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘should’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’” 64—but this
“deviation from the standard is generally accepted as a good reason” for the
criticism. 65 As Barzun describes it, the distinction is between recognizing
merely that “as a rule, men tend to take off their hats when entering church”
and recognizing “a rule that a man must bare his head in church.” 66 Those
adopting the internal point of view, Hart notes, often employ a “characteristic
vocabulary,” the way “the expression ‘Out’ or ‘Goal’” is used in baseball or
soccer: “the language of one assessing a situation by reference to rules which
he in common with others acknowledges as appropriate for this purpose.” 67
Some of these social rules also give rise to legal ones. Modern societies
don’t limit themselves to primary rules of conduct, like “don’t steal” or
“don’t murder.” They also have “secondary rules”—rules about rules, which
set out how we recognize certain rules, change their contents, or
authoritatively identify violations. 68 For example, a society might hold that
any rule “found in a written document or carved on some public monument”
is “a rule of the group[,] to be supported by the social pressure it exerts.” 69
Or we might recognize certain people as lawmakers or judges, with various
powers to change or apply the law by enacting statutes or hearing cases. By
combining primary and secondary rules, a society can generate the
enormously complex hierarchy of norms found in any modern legal system.
So Hart’s legal rules depend on social practice, but in a complicated and
indirect way. Legal rules ultimately derive from society’s ultimate “criteria
for identifying the law”—a “complex, but normally concordant, practice of
the courts, officials, and private persons.” 70 This rule-based practice is not
only something external observers can see and predict; it’s also something
people can accept and use from the internal perspective, along with the
“characteristic vocabulary” that goes with it (e.g., “it is the law that . . . ”).71
While the “ultimate rule of recognition” is an ordinary social rule, existing

63

Id. at 98.
Id. at 57.
65 Id. at 55.
66 Barzun, supra note 15, at 1344 (emphasis added and omitted) (citing HART, supra note 19, at 10,
56). But cf. Charles L. Barzun, Inside-Out: Beyond the Internal/External Distinction in Legal Scholarship,
101 VA. L. REV. 1203 (2015) (criticizing the internal/external distinction, on grounds we do not share).
67 HART, supra note 19, at 102.
68 Id. at 91–99.
69 Id. at 94.
70 Id. at 101, 110.
71 Id. at 102.
64
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only to the extent that it’s actually accepted by actual people, 72 the legal rules
it generates are not. These follow-on rules can exist so long as they are “valid
given the system’s criteria of validity,” whether or not they’re generally
accepted as standards in practice. 73
To take a stark historical example, when Congress provided civil law
for the Territory of Alaska, it did so through a massive feat of incorporation
by reference, enacting “[t]hat the general laws of the State of Oregon now in
force are hereby declared to be the law in said district, so far as the same may
be applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of this act or the laws of
the United States.” 74 Oregon law was apparently selected without regard to
its substance; the relevant committee picked Oregon over Washington
without making “any careful study of the laws [of] either,” but simply
because Oregon’s law seemed “in a more mature and satisfactory shape.” 75
As a result, Alaska’s law was clear in principle—it simply derived from
Oregon law—but largely mysterious in application. The Attorney General
soon reported to Congress that he had been unable to distribute statute books
to territorial officials because of the “[d]ifficulty . . . in obtaining some of the
necessary copies of these laws.” 76 Alaska’s governor complained that the
Attorney General wouldn’t provide advice about which laws were
“applicable” and “not in conflict” with federal law.77 One of Alaska’s new
judges called the Organic Act “a stupendous piece of stupidity.” 78 And some
lawyers even argued that juries had accidentally been made illegal, because
Oregon law required jurors to be taxpayers, but Congress had not imposed
taxes in Alaska. 79
72

Id. at 110.
Id.
74 Alaska Organic Act, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 24, 25–26 (1884).
75 The chairman of the relevant committee admitted that it had picked Oregon over Washington
“[n]ot because the committee had made any careful study of the laws either of the state of Oregon or of
the territory of Washington, but because it was supposed that the Oregon code was in a more mature and
satisfactory shape.” ERNEST GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA 52 (1954) (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 529
(1884) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Harrison)); see also 15 CONG. REC. 529 (1884) (noting that “Alaska
has . . . already been attached to Oregon for some judicial purposes”).
76 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE YEAR 1884, at 15 (1884).
77 § 7, 23 Stat. at 26; see also A.P. SWINEFORD, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF ALASKA TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 16 (1885) (“[T]he compilation issued by the late Attorney-General shows
the fact that that official is not empowered to decide upon the applicability of any law, and at the same
time makes more manifest the difficulty of such decision. Indeed, it intensifies that difficulty by
announcing the doubtful applicability even of some of the United States laws collated in the manual.”).
78 Myers v. Swineford, 1 Alaska 10, 12 (1888).
79 32 CONG. REC. 1937–38 (1899) (statement of Sen. Thomas Henry Carter) (noting that “[t]he
difficulty arises in a manner that Senators, without reflection, would not realize”); GRUENING, supra note
75, at 58. But see Kie v. United States, 27 F. 351, 357 (C.C.D. Or. 1886) (adapting Oregon’s jury73
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Of course, most law isn’t made so haphazardly (thank goodness). Yet
there’s nothing unique about Alaska that makes these things possible. The
simplest of secondary rules can generate unusual conclusions. If “whatever’s
carved on this public monument is law,” we might discover new law
whenever we dust off a previously overlooked carving. Or if “what the
Queen in Parliament enacts is law,” 80 we might find out that it’s illegal to
attend Parliament in a suit of armor, because a statute to that effect was duly
enacted and never repealed. 81 Law’s emphasis on legal structure, on the
official story of legal justification, means that its contents might often
surprise us. That’s why law can surprise one of two parties to a legal dispute,
both of whom are represented by well-trained lawyers, by telling them that
their conduct is not supported by deeper practice.
B. Mistakes and Departures
By distinguishing secondary rules from primary rules, Hart’s account
can also tolerate a certain amount of de facto deviation from the law. Hart
doesn’t take law to be a mere summary of whatever members of the legal
community do. Instead, the content of the law depends crucially on the
reasons they cite for doing it. So it’s perfectly coherent to say (as we have)
that while originalism is the official story of our legal system, many
individual cases may turn out to be wrongly decided under that standard. 82
The cases make claims to legal authority that sound in originalism, which is
what matters for the official story—but “the fact that [they] invoke
originalism doesn’t show that their specific claims are right, any more than
a man’s waving a yardstick shows that he is tall.” 83
Some are tempted to say that if the individual cases “are inconsistent
with the original meaning,” then “[t]o that extent, originalism is not our

qualification rules to Alaska); see also Endleman v. United States, 86 F. 456, 458 (9th Cir. 1898)
(describing an apparent jury trial in Alaska).
80 HART, supra note 19, at 120.
81 A Statute Forbidding Bearing of Armour 1313, 7 Edw. 2 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk
/aep/Edw2/7/0/section/wrapper1 [https://perma.cc/NJ6W-AUHN]; see also Louise Scrivens, Changing
the Flaws in London’s Laws, BBC NEWS (May 10, 2005, 05:24:05 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/uk_news/england/london/4527223.stm [https://perma.cc/N2XN-H8UK] (“A spokeswoman from the
Crown Prosecution Service said she did not know of any of these archaic laws coming to court lately. . . .
‘If anyone was caught in the Houses of Parliament wearing armour it would first be a matter for the
police,’ she added.”).
82 Baude & Sachs, supra note 12, at 108 (listing eleven possibilities, and suggesting that “more, or
more controversial, cases [might] belong on that list”).
83 Id. at 104–05.
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law.” 84 Hart’s account is different. While the “ultimate rule of recognition”
is a social rule, existing only to the extent that it’s recognized in practice,
intermediate legal rules—including those entailed by originalism—can be
said to exist when they are “valid given the system’s criteria of validity,”
even if they aren’t themselves generally accepted in practice.85 The official
story persists, though the officials charged with carrying it out are sometimes
mistaken, bribed, or responding to extralegal pressures. Such cases don’t
threaten the conventional Hartian framework, for all the reasons that Hart
argued for privileging the internal acceptance of rules over the purely
predictive account of the Holmesian “bad man.” 86 So long as the rule of
recognition is generally accepted and its outputs generally obeyed, the
absence of attention to particular rules does nothing to undermine their
validity. 87
To take a rather extreme example, suppose that, during the height of Al
Capone’s reign, his nephew had been sued in another state for a prior traffic
accident in Cook County, Illinois. The state court, attempting to apply
Illinois law as lex loci delicti, might have no doubt of how the Illinois courts
would rule: being afraid of Capone, they’d gin up some way to let the nephew
off (hopefully without affecting other cases). But Illinois law doesn’t provide
that the nephew wins, much less establish any general principle that “close
relatives of Al Capone can do no wrong.” To so maintain would be to confuse
the external and internal points of view, mistaking the practices that
correspond to individual legal rules for those that give rise to the ultimate
rule of recognition. We might recognize that, as a rule, Illinois’s legal
institutions let Capone relatives off easy, without anyone recognizing a rule
that they must do so. If no one in Illinois would use the “characteristic
vocabulary” of the internal perspective (“it is the law that . . . ”) to describe
the immunities of Capone’s friends and family—if those immunities are
solely matters of empirical description and prediction—then they’re not legal
immunities according to Hart.
Contra Primus, then, a legal critic of the Illinois courts could very well
argue for different results by “pointing to [their] present practices.” 88 That’s

84 Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1679 n.30 (2018). But see id. (“To
be sure, it is possible for originalism to be our law even if some particular decisions are hard to defend
on originalist principles.”).
85 HART, supra note 19, at 110.
86 See, e.g., id. at 40; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 459 (1897) (describing the “bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which [legal]
knowledge enables him to predict”).
87 See HART, supra note 19, at 108–10.
88 Primus, supra note 51, at 51.
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because the critic’s “calls for those practices to change” 89 are calls, not for
law reform, but for greater conformity to what Illinois already takes to be its
law. By contrast, in some societies, it is the law that high-status and lowstatus groups are subject to different pains and penalties. (Say, in the Salic
law’s differential treatment of Franks and Romans or in the notorious Black
Codes of the defeated Confederacy. 90) In other societies, sometimes
including our own, the law draws no such distinction, even if individual
officials might. We ought to be able to distinguish these cases accurately.
Likewise, we ought to be able to understand how the Fifteenth Amendment
was nullified in practice for decades, 91 even while its right against racial
discrimination in voting was consistently acknowledged as law. 92 Even for a
positivist, it’s far more natural to say that the right was poorly enforced—the
way that laws against sexual assault often are 93—rather than that it silently
ceased to be law for several decades, before regaining its legal validity
sometime in the twentieth century. The essence of the internal/external
distinction is not simply to accept that “[i]t is what the Court has been doing
that is our law” 94—for it matters greatly why a court is doing what it’s doing,
and what kind of grounds it can cite in support.
C. Conflicts of Legal Rules
Hart’s account easily handles occasional mistakes or departures from
the law. A more complicated case is presented by conflicts among different
purported legal rules, each of which is generally recognized as having legal
force. If a D.C. citizen wishes to sue in diversity, for example, most
American lawyers would say that she may: Congress has legislated in her

89

Id.
See, e.g., Oscar Ross Ewing, The New Legal Justice, 24 YALE L.J. 441, 442 (1915) (Franks and
Romans); CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88, pt. 1, at 110–17 (The Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 6, 1971) (Black Codes).
91 See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 105–16 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon,
17 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 308–10 (2000); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification
for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937, 1939 (1995) (noting that the Amendment
was “wildly unpopular” (among whites) when it was adopted).
92 E.g., REV. STAT. at 32 (2d ed. 1878) (listing the Amendment as part of the Constitution); Giles v.
Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 166 (1904). While there were occasional arguments that the Amendment itself
was not law, they were decidedly on the fringe, even during this period. Compare Arthur W. Machen, Jr.,
Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1910) (describing the Amendment as invalid),
with Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (“That the Fifteenth is valid . . . has been recognized and
acted on for half a century.”).
93 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287,
1292–99 (2016).
94 Primus, supra note 51, at 51–52 (emphasis omitted).
90
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favor, 95 the Supreme Court has upheld its action, 96 and she has every reason
to expect future courts to agree. At the same time, there’s a clear sense in
which diversity jurisdiction is lacking: Article III provides diversity
jurisdiction for “Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States,” 97
and ancient precedent correctly recognizes that the District isn’t a state.98 So
which of these positions is actually the law? How could an approach that’s
grounded in practice ever prefer one to the other?
These kinds of conflicts can be resolved on perfectly ordinary legal
grounds—indeed, much the same grounds that, in the previous Section,
handled the case of mistakes. In modern societies, law is a hierarchical and
structured normative practice. The lower order, on-the-ground legal rules are
valid only because the higher order, abstract ones say they are. So if there’s
a flaw in this process of inference, it’s the lower order conclusion, not the
higher order premise, that falls.
In a complex legal system, valid legal rules are usually entailed by
what’s accepted as a matter of practice, rather than being so accepted
themselves. A Fish and Wildlife Service permit to import an endangered
elephant, for example, 99 doesn’t carry legal force as a pure matter of social
practice; it’s only valid (if at all) in light of a series of other legal rules—
published regulations, 100 duly enacted statutes, 101 the enumerated powers of
Congress, 102 and so on. On Hart’s account, this chain of authority eventually
terminates in an ultimate rule of recognition, one that requires no further
legal validation and that’s grounded directly on social facts. 103 Properly
identifying a society’s ultimate rule of recognition means identifying which
parts of its legal system are not ultimate, which then lets us identify the
various intermediate rules on which those parts depend. A rule like “arson is
unlawful” needn’t be accepted as standing “on its own bottom,” so to
speak; 104 it might instead be accepted as a consequence of other, intermediate
legal rules, such as those concerning the authority of criminal statutes. In
other words, how rules are taken as law matters at least as much as the fact
95

28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (2012).
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 603–04 (1949).
97 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
98 Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805).
99 See Sachs, supra note 56, at 2274–75 (offering this example).
100 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11(a), (h), 17.21(b), 17.22 (2018).
101 16 U.S.C. §§ 742b, 1533, 1538(a)(1)(A), 1539(a) (2012).
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103 See HART, supra note 19, at 109.
104 See Sachs, supra note 56, at 2274; see also Matthew Kramer, Of Final Things: Morality as One
of the Ultimate Determinants of Legal Validity, 24 LAW & PHIL. 47, 57 (2005) (noting that standards of
legal validity are routinely “derivative of the criteria which make up th[e] overarching rule”).
96
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that they’re so taken: dumping everything into an undifferentiated category
of “acceptance,” or claiming that every legal rule rests directly on social
practice, would get the social practices wrong.
This is why the legal system’s structure of justification is so
important—not because abstract rules are somehow more special than
pedestrian ones, but because this structure is built into the rule of recognition,
which addresses some topics directly and leaves others to be determined only
by inference. Societies that have different structures of legal justification
have different laws: a legal world in which elephant import permits require
no authorization from Congress is a different legal world from one in which
they do. (Or perhaps more to the point, a legal world in which constitutional
arguments are expected to have a basis in the original Constitution is
different from one in which they aren’t.)
So to return to the D.C. citizen, it’s common in our system for a statute
to say one thing while the Constitution says another. But another rule of our
system provides that the Constitution controls. And it’s also common in our
system for a Supreme Court decision to say one thing while the best reading
of the legal materials suggests that the decision is wrong. Indeed, “[a]ll
modern lawyers would understand the distinction that this statement
draws.” 105
Under our system’s rules of precedent, legal actors are sometimes
commanded to follow a Supreme Court decision “as if” it were the law—
even as the underlying legal materials, which command ultimate authority,
prescribe a different result. 106 Just as parties to a case can be bound to an
erroneous judgment by principles of preclusion, requiring them to act in
future cases “as if” the judgment were accurate, lower courts can be bound
to an erroneous Supreme Court decision by principles of stare decisis,
requiring them to treat the decision “as if” it properly stated the law. This “as
if” law can be binding on particular actors without thereby becoming the
law 107—much the way a runner can be called “out” by an umpire and treated
as if he were “out” for the remainder of the game, though in truth he actually
touched the plate first and was safe. 108
So we can say—and indeed we ought to say—that in truth there’s no
diversity jurisdiction in a case between a citizen of the District and a citizen
of Virginia. Nor is there diversity jurisdiction in a case between two citizens
105 Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921,
937 (2013).
106 See Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2019) (manuscript at
38–40), http://ssrn.com/id=3064443 [https://perma.cc/7VWD-KNYP].
107 Id.
108 See HART, supra note 19, at 142–46.
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of Virginia, though one of them may have persuaded an appellate panel that
he’s really a citizen of New York. In either case, under our law of vertical
precedent, a district judge is nonetheless bound to act “as if” the appellate
court’s determination were correct, understanding that any error in that
determination is to be corrected only on appeal. And when the error is one
day corrected—and the existing decision revised in favor of the correct
understanding of the law or facts—then the error will lack even “as if” legal
force. All of these rules coexist, in a way that most lawyers can understand,
as part of the structured practice that ultimately defines our law.
D. Global Error
On this account of legal structure, we can be surprised by, mistaken
about, or disobedient toward the law without it ceasing to be law. 109 And we
can sometimes face conflicts between two seemingly valid legal rules, with
the law itself telling us which rule has the stronger claim. 110 As one of us has
argued at greater length elsewhere, it’s even possible for an entire society to
be mistaken—to experience “global error” about its law 111—if its members
have thus far overlooked some fact of agreed-on legal significance. This
possibility may sound odd for a positivist, as ultimately the law is supposed
to rest on social practice, about which it’s impossible for everyone to be
wrong. But that social practice includes a process of reasoning and inference
about which everyone can be wrong—and which actually gets us from social
rules to legal ones.
This last step strikes some folks as the thirteenth chime. Not everyone
agrees that global error is possible for positivists. Nor does everyone agree
that legal rules can remain in existence despite being overlooked, even
explicitly rejected, by society and its officials. As Barzun writes, if the rule
of recognition is a practice of courts and others in identifying the law by
reference to certain criteria, “[i]t follows . . . that a rule [that] no court applies
cannot be law.” 112 Barzun recognizes that “compliance with a rule is a
distinct conceptual question from its validity,”113 but he contends that this
distinction applies only with respect to the compliance “of those people to
whom this rule has been applied—assuming that judges do apply the rule.” 114
On his reading, jaywalking can still be illegal even though many people
jaywalk, as courts confronted with a jaywalking case will easily recognize
109
110
111
112
113
114

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.C.
See Sachs, supra note 56, at 2268–72.
Barzun, supra note 15, at 1360 n.228.
Id. at 1360–61 n.228.
Id. at 1361 n.228.
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the prohibition. But, he argues, Hart “was not talking about a rule that is
ineffective because no courts apply it.” 115
We think this is wrong as a matter of exegesis, as well as of
jurisprudence. Hart is at pains to distinguish “the validity and the ‘efficacy’
of law.” 116 As he describes it, efficacy is a function of actual obedience, a
matter of “fact” to be observed or predicted. 117 Validity, though, is a matter
of logical relationships with other rules: “[t]o say that a given rule is valid is
to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and
so as a rule of the system.” 118 Hart found it “plain that there is no necessary
connection between the validity of any particular rule and its efficacy”—
unless the rule of recognition just happens so to provide, as in legal systems
containing rules of desuetude or obsolescence. 119 Contra Barzun, a legal rule
is valid if and only if it passes the tests; a pattern of enforcement is
unnecessary, judicial or otherwise.
Our reading of Hart’s distinction between efficacy and validity is
supported by his similar distinction between the ultimate rule of recognition
and the subordinate legal rules it recognizes. The rule of recognition is a
social rule; “[i]ts existence is a matter of fact,” 120 to be determined by
“whether it is the practice of courts, legislatures, officials, or private citizens
. . . actually to use this rule as an ultimate rule of recognition.”121 As in a
“simple system of primary rules of obligation,” the “assertion that a given
rule exist[s]” can only be determined by whether, “as a matter of fact, a given
mode of behaviour [i]s generally accepted as a standard.” 122 But subordinate
legal rules in a complex system are different: we determine whether they
exist, not by assessing actual practice, but by applying the rule of recognition
in a process of legal reasoning. 123 “We only need the word ‘validity’ . . . to
answer questions which arise within a system of rules where the status of a
rule as a member of the system depends on its satisfying certain criteria
provided by the rule of recognition.” 124 With a rule of recognition added to
the system, a rule “exists” when it’s “valid given the system’s criteria of
validity.” 125 If the legal community shares an official story of its law, which
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
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sets out criteria of validity and a structure of legal justification, then
ordinarily we can just go ahead and apply those criteria to determine what
the law is.
When judges and officials appear to depart from this official story, that
doesn’t refute its status as law. Rather, these departures are often merely
evidence of a more complex consensus, in which the acknowledged criteria
have various implicit or unstated exceptions. For Hart, there’s nothing odd
about accepted rules being defeasible in this way: “[a] rule that ends with the
word ‘unless . . . ’ is still a rule.” 126 But whatever the criteria of validity may
be, those criteria are to be applied from the internal point of view, using the
“characteristic vocabulary” of “it is the law that . . . ,” and so on. So it matters
greatly whether any purported departures or limitations are actually
understood and defended as permissible exceptions—as bona fide features
of the official story, the way “canceled” and “cancelled” are both accepted
spellings—or whether they’re just ordinary errors or “deviation[s] from the
standard,” 127 in which case the valid legal rule lives on despite them. In the
latter case, as Greenberg puts it, a rule that lacks consensus in practice may
still be “validated by a criterion that is itself grounded in such a
consensus” 128—or, in Hart’s words, the rule “may be valid and in that sense
‘exist’ even if it is generally disregarded.” 129
In Barzun’s favor, Hart does recognize efficacy, in some sense, as a
precondition of a legal system. If the “rules of the system” as a whole fall
into “general disregard,” then that system may have “ceased to be the legal
system of the group.” 130 But, Hart cautions, it would “be wrong to say that
statements of validity ‘mean’ that the system is generally efficacious.” 131
Those who assert a rule’s validity may presuppose a rule of recognition that’s
“actually accepted and employed in the general operation of the system,”132
without necessarily asserting this kind of efficacy, much less predicting it—
and especially without predicting the courts’ enforcement of each individual
rule.
Indeed, Hart explicitly rejects the view that “to assert the validity of a
rule is to predict that it will be enforced by courts or some other official

126
127
128
129
130
131
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Id. at 139.
Id. at 55.
Greenberg, supra note 1, at 115.
HART, supra note 19, at 110.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 108.
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action taken.” 133 Valid rules usually are enforced in that way, but that’s not
what makes them valid; such a claim “neglect[s] the special character of the
internal statement and treat[s] it as an external statement about official
action.” 134 A judge’s statement that a legal rule is valid “is an internal
statement recognizing that the rule satisfies the tests for identifying what is
to count as law in his court, and constitutes not a prophecy of but part of the
reason for his decision.” 135 That’s why Hart’s Postscript rejects the idea that
legal rules are “in effect . . . only if [they are] accepted and practised in the
law-identifying and law-applying operations of the courts”; instead, they’re
“identifiable as valid legal rules by the criteria provided by the rule of
recognition,” and they can “exist as legal rules from the moment of their
enactment before any occasion for their practice has arisen.” 136
So it isn’t really decisive, as the question is sometimes phrased, what a
judge would really do if presented with a knock-down originalist argument
for some outlandish legal conclusion. The deep structure of our legal system
is a question of present law, not a prediction of future behavior. Maybe if
someone discovered irrefutable evidence that, say, Brown v. Board of
Education 137 couldn’t be justified under the original Fourteenth
Amendment, 138 we’d all decide to deem Brown such a “fixed star in our
constitutional constellation” 139 that it’d remain valid even without any roots
in the law of 1868. But that would require departing from our currently
operative legal rules, rather than simply applying their terms. 140 Just as law
isn’t “the prediction of what courts will do when a case arises,” it also isn’t
“the prediction of what we will do when push comes to shove.” 141
Perhaps Hart is wrong about all this. As noted above, 142 he’s a bigger
target than we are, and he has many abler defenders. But if originalism is
133 Id. at 104; cf. Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514, 517 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002)
(describing the broader universe of “sanction theories” as “nearly friendless”).
134 HART, supra note 19, at 105.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 256.
137 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
138 But see McConnell, supra note 91.
139 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (Jackson, J.).
140 See Baude, supra note 8, at 2380–81 (discussing Brown); Sachs, supra note 56, at 2276–78
(same). For another example, see William Baude, The Court, or the Constitution?, in MORAL PUZZLES
AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES: ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY ALEXANDER 260, 270 (Heidi M. Hurd
ed., 2019) (“There will likely come a time when the conflict between judicial supremacy and the original
Constitution becomes open and notorious. . . . And if we do pick [judicial supremacy], that will mark a
fundamental revolution in our constitutional order.”).
141 See Sachs, supra note 56, at 2275.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 49–50.
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consistent with the most commonly accepted theory of jurisprudence in the
American academy, that’s a significant finding on its own. An originalist
rule can still be a legal rule, even if no court applies it—so long as the legal
system still recognizes an official story with that result. And so there’s
nothing impossible or paradoxical about saying that legal practice shows
originalism to be our law—even if some widely accepted legal practices
might turn out to be inconsistent with the original Constitution.
PRACTICE
The critiques of original-law originalism discussed above have raised
deep issues of legal theory, which we have tried our best to address. But in
our view, the more enduring dispute between us and many of our critics is
far more banal: it’s a simple empirical disagreement. Maybe our beliefs seem
odd, not because there’s anything wrong with our legal theory, but simply
because other readers don’t see how our existing legal practice grounds a
form of originalism.
We’ve previously identified this commitment to original law in many
aspects of our practice. Among other things:
(1) We treat the Constitution as a legal text, originally enacted in the
late eighteenth century. 143
(2) This constitutional text regulates the selection of legal officials,
even when such regulations are unpopular or contrary to
tradition. 144
(3) Actors in our legal system don’t acknowledge, and indeed reject,
any official legal breaks or discontinuities from the Founding. 145
(4) We rely on technical domesticating doctrines, themselves rooted in
preexisting law, to blunt the practical force of novel originalist
arguments. 146
(5) Original meaning sometimes explicitly prevails over policy
arguments in constitutional adjudication, but the reverse doesn’t
seem to be true. 147
(6) Our treatment of precedent makes sense if original sources
determine the Constitution’s content but not if precedent does. 148

143
144
145
146
147
148

Baude, supra note 8, at 2366–67; Sachs, supra note 5, at 872.
Baude, supra note 8, at 2367–68.
Sachs, supra note 5, at 864–71.
Id. at 873–74, 838.
Baude, supra note 8, at 2374–75.
Id. at 2375–76; Sachs, supra note 5, at 860–64; see also Green, supra note 2, at 499, 519–23.
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(7) More generally, there are no clear repudiations of originalism as
our law in the current canon of Supreme Court cases, even in
situations where the Justices must have been sorely tempted. 149

We don’t claim that any one of these points is dispositive. But taken
together, they help guide us toward the “complex, but normally concordant,
practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by
reference to certain criteria,” which Hart dubbed our rule of recognition. 150
That practice, we’ve argued, is one that supports original-law originalism.
A. Pedigree
Those who’ve seriously addressed this evidence have expressed
different reasons for doubt. Barzun, for instance, denies that there’s any
social practice requiring permissible interpretation of the Constitution to find
a pedigree back to the Founding. 151 “The problem with this view,” he writes,
“is that judicial practice does not require interpretive rules to be validated in
this way.” 152 Instead, Barzun argues:
[T]here is an obvious alternative explanation for how courts treat interpretive
rules. What the Court requires is some historical support for its interpretive
approach in order to prove that it is not making [it] up out of whole cloth. The
fact that a rule has been around for a long time suggests that it may be
considered custom. And customary law is authoritative not because its pedigree
is traceable to a particular validating event but rather because its age and
endurance over time suggest that it works well or has been broadly accepted.
Under this quite conventional common law understanding, the Court’s
“methodological hierarchy” is not just not “explicit.” It is nonexistent. 153

This kind of empirical disagreement is more productive than the
theoretical ones. But it still proceeds much too quickly, both in weighing the
evidence and in describing the substance of our law.
1. Evidence
In assessing the evidence, Barzun places too much weight on the lack
of an explicit and complete pedigree in individual judicial opinions, in a way
that’s disconnected from ordinary norms of citation and opinion-writing. The
fact that courts don’t always trace their reasoning all the way back to the rule
149 Baude, supra note 8, at 2376–86; see also William Baude, Adam S. Chilton & Anup Malani,
Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 54–
57 (2017) (describing the empirical methodology behind this claim).
150 HART, supra note 19, at 110.
151 Barzun, supra note 15, at 1347–48.
152 Id. at 1348.
153 Id. at 1349–50 (footnote omitted).

1478

113:1455 (2019)

Grounding Originalism

of recognition doesn’t mean that there is no rule of recognition animating
that reasoning; it simply means that we have to look harder and more
carefully to see if there is one.
Consider, by analogy, how courts deal with statutes in the American
legal system. Federal statutes can be found in several different collections of
books, most importantly in both the Statutes at Large and the United States
Code. Of these two, the Statutes at Large, and not the U.S. Code, is the more
legally authoritative source.154 The reason for this is that the Statutes at Large
contains nearly everything enacted by Congress pursuant to the process laid
out in Article I. 155 The U.S. Code is assembled outside of the lawmaking
process by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel, a group of unelected
officials appointed by the Speaker of the House to recompile and reorganize
the enacted text.156 (Some volumes of the Code are sometimes then enacted
by Congress and thereby turned into positive law, 157 at least until those
volumes are again amended by new statutes.158)
If you looked only at the citation practices of the Supreme Court, you
might well be ignorant of all this. Many opinions addressing federal statutes
provide citations to the U.S. Code, without in turn tracing those provisions
back to their exact pedigree in the Statutes at Large, let alone to the
provisions that empower Congress to enact laws. 159 Sometimes, U.S. Code
citations are even required by rules of court.160 But it would be a mistake to
conclude from this citation practice that there is no legal hierarchy between
the Code and the Statutes at Large—or that this citation practice reflects any
abandonment of the requirements of Article I.
Rather, one has to look a little harder to discover the true official story
of federal statutory law. For one thing, the Code and the Statutes themselves

154

See infra notes 161–166 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Ralph H. Dwan & Ernest R. Feidler, The Federal Statutes—Their
History and Use, 22 MINN. L. REV. 1008, 1010 (1938).
156 2 U.S.C. §§ 285b–285c (2012). See generally Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not
Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 283 (2007) (distinguishing the Statutes from the Code).
157 See OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, POSITIVE LAW CODIFICATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
CODE,
http://uscode.house.gov/codification/positive_law_codification.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SYA6-M26U].
158 See Will Baude, Reminder: The United States Code Is Not the Law, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp
/2017/05/15/reminder-the-united-states-code-is-not-the-law [https://perma.cc/Y42U-TFL9].
159 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624, 1627 (2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 102,
103, 157).
160 See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 34.5 (“All references to a provision of federal statutory law should ordinarily
be cited to the United States Code, if the provision has been codified therein. In the event the provision
has not been classified to the United States Code, citation should be to the Statutes at Large.”).
155
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agree on their relative authority. 161 And in the rare cases in which the
question becomes relevant, legal experts do indeed remember the true
hierarchy. In U.S. National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents
of America, 162 the Supreme Court considered the validity of the Act of Sept.
7, 1916, 39 Stat. 753, part of which had been omitted from the U.S. Code for
over forty years “with a note indicating that Congress had repealed it in
1918.” 163 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the omitted statute was still
legally operative, construing the repealing act more narrowly than the
codifiers had—and applying the oft-forgotten rule that the U.S. Code is
merely “‘prima facie’ evidence that the provision has the force of law,” while
the Statutes at Large are “legal evidence.”164 Indeed, even the “enacted” titles
of the U.S. Code, which do enjoy the status of “legal evidence,” 165 are
displaced by subsequent uncodified provisions of the Statutes at Large—for
example, the provisions governing the appointment of the FBI director. 166
Much of our legal system lacks the formality of the U.S. Code. But this
example confirms that the first layer of legal citations doesn’t always reflect
the deep structure of the law. Lawyers and judges use the U.S. Code on a
daily basis, and often they might forget to double-check the law that lies
beneath it. 167 For the same reasons, lawyers and judges might write
extensively about the income tax without first reciting the portions of the
Sixteenth Amendment that authorized it (or the portions of Article V that
authorize amendments, of Article VII that discuss ratification, etc.).168 The
hierarchy matters when a relevant question is raised.
That’s also why lawyers and judges might also cite judicial precedents,
reason from prevailing doctrine, and so on, instead of beginning every brief
or opinion with materials that date to the Founding. 169 It’s only to be
161 Compare Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 388, § 112, 61 Stat. 633, 636 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112)
(“legal evidence”), with id. § 204(a), 61 Stat. at 638 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 204(a)) (“prima facie”
evidence).
162 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
163 Id. at 441–42.
164 Id. at 448 (citations omitted); cf. id. at 453–63 (addressing a substantive question, irrelevant here,
of how to read the 1916 Act and 1918 repeal together).
165 1 U.S.C. § 204(a).
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 532 (2012) (“The Attorney General may appoint a Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.”), abrogated by Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, § 1101, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 532 note) (providing that, starting in
the 1970s, “the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate”).
167 See Dorsey, supra note 156.
168 See United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U.S. 141, 145 (2014); Daniel Hemel & Kyle
Rozema, Inequality and the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 70 TAX L. REV. 667 (2017).
169 Cf. Eric Segall, Originalist Judicial Activism, DORF ON LAW (July 12, 2018, 3:30 PM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/07/originalist-judicial-activism.html [https://perma.cc/R8KS-N6AV]

1480

113:1455 (2019)

Grounding Originalism

expected, after two centuries of constitutional litigation, that there’d be past
decisions on adjacent questions that speak in more granular terms than does
the constitutional text.170 Originalism doesn’t declare all these other sources
inadmissible; it simply makes their authority contingent on certain
factors 171—or, to put it another way, it makes them vulnerable to originalist
refutation. 172 What we’re after here is a criterion of validity, not a drafting
guide. The legal system has rules about which sources of law trump others
in case of conflict, and both lawyers and judges will recognize as much when
the question is straightforwardly posed. 173 Surface-level citation practices
don’t tell us all (or even most) of what we want to know about the deep
structure of law.
Of course, looking to deep structure carries evidentiary problems of its
own. Greenberg, for example, finds it simply implausible that there’s a
sufficiently convergent practice of interpretation to count as law in Hart’s
sense. 174 He correctly recognizes that it is possible for there to be “a
consensus criterion that points to a legal answer, yet the participants in the
consensus have failed to notice that their criterion yields that legal answer,”
for instance because it is “a criterion the application of which is
controversial.” 175 But he argues that it is “harder to see how the relevant legal
standards could have remained unrecognized.” 176 There would have to be “a
consensus that pointed to a source of law,” yet at the same time some
“empirical mistake about what that source of law specified, perhaps because
the source had somehow been lost.” 177 Instead, the “most promising type of
candidate would be a normative one—what democracy requires, for
example,” and not the kind of legal and historical pedigree to which we
point. 178
Alas, legal history is hard. It’s hard enough to trace the title of a single
parcel of land back to legal grants a few centuries old. 179 It isn’t surprising
(criticizing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1740–48 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring), in part because “no originalist evidence was presented”).
170 See Sachs, supra note 56, at 2292.
171 Baude, supra note 8, at 2375–76; Sachs, supra note 5, at 860–64; see Green, supra note 2,
at 519–23.
172 See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 158, 167 (2017).
173 See SUP. CT. R. 34.5 (“Additional or alternative citations should be provided only if there is a
particular reason why those citations are relevant or necessary to the argument.”).
174 Greenberg, supra note 1, at 114–18.
175 Id. at 117.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 E.g., United States v. Old Dominion Boat Club, 630 F.3d 1039, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (tracing a
social club’s property back to King Charles I).
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that tracing the title of every relevant interpretive method might be much
harder, given that the relevant materials are much vaster and the
consequences more sweeping. And it also isn’t surprising that disagreement
might be rampant where the claims of pedigree are often implicit, the
historical assumptions often unspoken, and, frankly, legal scholarship only
beginning to offer serious help. In this world, the problem is not so much
that the Founding-era Codex of Legal Methods of Interpretation has been
temporarily mislaid but rather that we need to reorient our minds toward
doing carefully and explicitly what’s often done casually or implicitly. That
the criteria are imperfectly applied doesn’t mean that they’re absent or even
imprecise.
2. Substance
The relationship of the Code to the Statutes is illuminating in another
way. It illustrates how the substance of modern law reflects an accumulation
of certain materials from the past.
Consider what would be necessary to compile the text of a fully
complete and correct U.S. Code. It would include everything Congress has
lawfully enacted since the Founding, with edits to reflect every lawful repeal
or amendment. Actually setting out that text might involve some hideously
complex legal judgments—determining the scope of ambiguous repeals,180
applying the enrolled bill rule, 181 and so on. But we’d have no trouble
articulating what it would look like in principle; nor would we be surprised
that its present content might depend on the past.
The same goes for compiling a fully complete and correct text of the
Constitution. The official story would start with Ratification and go from
there. We might need to answer some complicated questions about
subsequent amendments—say, involving Article V’s tacit domain
restrictions, 182 the de facto government doctrine,183 or the doctrine of
scrivener’s error. 184 But the basic idea that we’re supposed to trace
developments from the Founding isn’t very controversial, even if any actual
attack on a particular amendment would be. Subsequent amendments are
officially held to be valid only because they were adopted at a particular time
and in a particular way. 185
180

See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
182 See Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment: Normative
Defense and Implications, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, no. 1, 2017, at 167, 175–76.
183 See Harrison, supra note 30, at 429–51.
184 See United States v. House, 617 F. Supp. 237, 239 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (disregarding
typographical errors in state resolutions ratifying the Sixteenth Amendment).
185 See Sachs, supra note 5, at 868–71.
181
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Indeed, if we wanted to compile a fully complete and correct account
of the entire corpus juris of U.S. law, it might similarly include all the law as
it stood at the time of the Founding, with adjustments for all the lawful
alterations and amendments made since. Not all of our law is written, and
that’s okay; originalism can tolerate a partially unwritten original law. But
our system does require a certain kind of pedigree, commonly associated
with written law—as is appropriate for a system with a written Constitution.
We might argue over the legality of particular alterations or amendments,
but it’s not hard to see why the project would proceed in chronological order,
resting today’s law on that of the past.
This means that much of Barzun’s alternative explanation of our
practices, that interpretive rules may also derive from a “quite conventional
common law understanding” of “customary law,” 186 is perfectly consistent
with our view of the original law. Customary law was itself a wellrecognized kind of law at the Founding, and the Founders’ law likely
included the possibility, within certain fields, of legal “evol[ution] by slow
accretion.” 187 (If the law of the Founding included a customary law of
admiralty—or indeed a customary general common law—then these fields
of law remain customary today, unless something was lawfully done to
change them.) We see such customary fields, together with any limits on
their potential evolution, as possible contingent implications of our legal
system’s official story. 188
By contrast, Barzun proposes customary law as an alternative to our
view, requiring confidence that it would still be compatible with American
legal norms regardless of whether there had been such law at the Founding—
apparently, even if the modern use of customary law in a given field were
entirely the product of some mid-century judicial power grab. 189 That, we
think, is a much taller order, at least as judged by our existing legal culture.190

186

See Barzun, supra note 15, at 1349–50.
Baude & Sachs, supra note 3, at 1138.
188 Cf. id. at 1132–36, 1139 (noting that, in our system, certain types of interpretive rules do their
work upon a text’s enactment, and that they wouldn’t continue to revise its legal content as they evolve
over time).
189 See Sachs, supra note 56, at 2281 (considering a hypothetical example in which stare decisis
“turned out to be largely a modern invention”).
190 Cf. Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: An Uneasy Day for Presidential Power, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 13, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/argument-recap-an-uneasy-day-forpresidential-power [https://perma.cc/VCK6-5UDM] (describing oral argument in NLRB v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014), and noting that the Solicitor General “seemed to startle even some of the more
liberal judges when he said that, if it was a contest between historical practice and the words of the
Constitution, practice should count the most”).
187
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B. Pretense
A different form of skepticism about our empirical account argues that
we have described not practice but pretense. Professor Mikołaj
Barczentewicz discusses the prospect of a systematic divergence between
what our officials say and what they do. Our officials might recite
originalism while acting in nonoriginalist ways—“publicly avow[ing]” rules
that “their actions appear to violate” 191—resulting in a “systematic practice
of officials, guided by general rules, which is inconsistent with the ‘official
story’ of the law that officials sell to the public.” 192 As Professor Eric Posner
once put it, “our political culture . . . happens to require ritual obeisance to
the founders,” in much the same way that Roman culture required priests to
examine bird entrails, and with no greater consequences for actual decisionmaking. 193 If so, originalism might be an empty ritual or noble lie, 194 with no
resemblance to actual legal practice—like the vaunted freedoms of speech
and press promised by the Soviet Constitution, 195 which served only as traps
for the unwary. 196
We think this scenario would raise deep questions of jurisprudence,
which one of us has posed before under the moniker of “the Illuminati
Problem.” 197 We intend to answer them in a separate work for the
jurisprudentially inclined,198 where we will argue that the official public
story, not the subterranean official practice, would nonetheless control. But
that’s a topic for another day. We don’t need high theory to answer the charge
because the hypothetical isn’t posed by our practice.
Looking at our legal system, the participants don’t seem to treat
Founding-era law as if it were simply an empty promise like the Soviet
Constitution, or even a vaunted symbol like the American flag that hangs in
191

Mikołaj Barczentewicz, The Illuminati Problem and Rules of Recognition, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 500, 504 (2018).
192 Id. at 503; see also Greenberg, supra note 1, at 117 (“Being disposed to accede to a form of
words—to give lip service—does not even amount to genuine belief, let alone a convergence of
practice.”).
193 Eric
Posner, Originalism Class 4: Brown, ERIC POSNER (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://ericposner.com/originalism-class-4-brown [https://perma.cc/B3HR-L7D5].
194 Cf. Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911 (2018) (arguing
that the Court’s formalism is such a lie).
195 See KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1936) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 125,
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/1936toc.html [https://perma.cc/3335-WPCJ].
196 See SAMANTHA LOMB, STALIN’S CONSTITUTION: SOVIET PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND THE
DISCUSSION OF THE 1936 DRAFT CONSTITUTION 135 (2018) (noting that “[t]he ratification of the 1936
Constitution contributed to repression in 1937,” as early attempts to exercise new rights persuaded the
NKVD “to unleash mass arrests of ‘anti-Soviet’ elements”).
197 See Barczentewicz, supra note 191, at 502 (citing Baude, supra note 8, at 2388).
198 See William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Official Story (work in progress) (on file with authors).
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each courtroom. Rather, they formulate originalist claims as actual
arguments: as if they cared about convincing others and not as mere
ceremony.
Consider, for instance, the many briefs spent discussing history and
original meaning in the recent litigation over the Emoluments Clause. 199
Indeed, at one point, an ally of the plaintiffs believed that she had uncovered
documents in the National Archives refuting the work of a leading originalist
scholar of the Clause. 200 The perceived discovery was widely and excitedly
discussed because it was thought to address an important argument. 201 And
when the originalist scholar produced extensive documentary evidence and
expert opinion undermining the discovery’s significance, 202 it worked: most
of those who had challenged him on that particular point reconsidered and
confessed error, 203 even as they continued to press originalist arguments on
other points.
This looks to us like a process that takes originalist arguments seriously.
Clients spend good money hiring lawyers to dig up originalist evidence—the
stronger the evidence, the better—which is then treated as meaningful even
by those who rarely describe themselves as originalists. 204 This suggests that
originalism isn’t merely something at which to genuflect before moving on
to the real grounds of decision, for then the quality of originalist argument
199 See Seth Barrett Tillman, A Work in Progress: Select Bibliography of Court Filings and Other
Sources Regarding the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses Cases, THE NEW REFORM
CLUB (Feb. 28, 2018, 8:59 AM), https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2018/02/a-work-in-progress-selectbibliography.html [https://perma.cc/8HBC-L7P8] (citing sources).
200 See Brianne J. Gorod, What Alexander Hamilton Really Said, TAKE CARE BLOG (July 6, 2017),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/what-alexander-hamilton-really-said
[https://perma.cc/D5TS-NR9F];
Brianne J. Gorod, A Little More on Alexander Hamilton and the Foreign Emoluments Clause, TAKE CARE
BLOG (Aug. 1, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/a-little-more-on-alexander-hamilton-and-theforeign-emoluments-clause [https://perma.cc/ZC9Q-9MM2].
201 Gautham Rao & Jed Shugerman, Presidential Revisionism, SLATE (July 17, 2017, 5:42 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/the_new_york_times_publishe
d_the_flimsiest_defense_of_trump_s_apparent_emoluments.html [https://perma.cc/N6X8-M8TF]; Jed
Shugerman, Questions About the Emoluments Amicus Brief on Behalf of Trump, SHUGERBLOG (Aug. 31,
2017), https://shugerblog.com/2017/08/31/questions-about-the-emoluments-amicus-brief-on-behalf-oftrump-and-its-use-and-misuse-of-historical-sources [https://perma.cc/ENN8-T8QF].
202 Declaration of Seth Barrett Tillman, Response to Amici Curiae by Certain Legal Historians,
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00458-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19,
2017), 2017 WL 7795997.
203 Jed Shugerman, An Apology to Tillman and Blackman, SHUGERBLOG (Sep. 23, 2017),
https://shugerblog.com/2017/09/23/an-apology-to-tillman-and-blackman
[https://perma.cc/3NC8NX4Q]; Jed Shugerman et al., Our Correction and Apology to Professor Tillman, SHUGERBLOG (Oct. 3,
2017),
https://shugerblog.com/2017/10/03/our-correction-and-apology-to-professor-tillman
[https://perma.cc/3N8Y-4ZTR].
204 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 640–70 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the early history of the Second Amendment).
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wouldn’t matter so much. If originalism is a ritual, it’s a ritual that obeys the
full form of legal argument. If originalism is a pretense, the pretense runs
deep.
Nor does it seem to us a coincidence that both textualist and purposivist
scholars have attempted to ground their proposed methods in Founding-era
evidence 205 or in the text and structure of the Constitution more generally. 206
Rather, we think the more natural explanation is that our system requires
legal norms to bear a certain kind of pedigree—often implicit, to be sure,207
but traceable back to the system’s origins.
C. Motivated Reasoning
Alternatively, originalism might be more than a noble lie without fully
determining official behavior. Primus, for example, argues that “originalist
argumentation suffers from motivated reasoning more than it suffers from
purposeful duplicity.” 208 On Primus’s account, judges “are liable to misread
originalist source material in ways congenial to their own preferred
dispositions of cases,” though they do so “sincerely believ[ing] that their
actions accord with original meanings.” 209 They “feel[] an obligation to show
fidelity to original meanings—or at least to avoid showing infidelity to
them—but not an obligation passively to follow original meanings wherever
they might lead.” 210
In our view, this kind of account (if true) would do more to support
originalism than to undermine it. Again, originalism is a criterion of validity,
not a drafting guide or decision procedure. Judges who follow the Founders’
law are obliged to make decisions consistent with it. But that doesn’t dictate
exactly how they go about their decision-making—whether through
consulting the parties’ arguments, plumbing their own intuitions, pursuing a
broad reflective equilibrium, reading massive amounts of historical
materials, or something else. And if social rules really do require conformity
to a particular official story, then officials’ engaging in sincere but
“motivated reasoning” when that story conflicts with their other preferences
is exactly what we should expect.

205 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1030–57; John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79–102 (2001).
206 William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 527
(1992); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 706–25
(1997).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 153–173 (discussing Barzun).
208 Primus, supra note 51, at 57.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 56 (emphasis omitted).
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After all, officials routinely engage in motivated reasoning as to
whether their plans are “legal,” full stop—accepting a lower quality of legal
argument in their favor than they demand of arguments against them. 211 We
shouldn’t expect any greater commitment to originalism than we do to the
law in general. Primus repeats Professor Karl Llewellyn’s warning that
“[w]hat satisfies the conscience lulls the mind”; 212 but this motivated
reasoning is still reasoning, and it still admits the force of originalist
arguments that might wake us from our dogmatic slumbers. 213 So long as
originalist arguments still carry that force, originalism is still the law.
D. Alternatives
We believe we’ve put forward the best account of the official story of
our constitutional law. But many remain skeptical of our empirical claims,
so let us regroup. As we noted at the outset, our first core claim is that
theories of legal interpretation ought to give more emphasis to questions of
what the law actually is. That claim is independent of our empirical case. So
even if one rejects our own originalist views, the question remains: What,
then, is our law? If not originalism, what?
Positive law provides a lens to judge not only originalism but its
alternatives. We can’t describe all of those alternatives in this short space,
let alone presume to refute them. But in examining some of the stronger ones,
we can see that none of them has made a better claim to be our positive law.
If a reader has the sense that we haven’t quite bridged the gap between our
theories and observed constitutional practice, we hope we can at least show
that our competition must cross comparable gaps.
For instance, Professor David Strauss has famously proposed that we
have a common law constitution, one in which “now-established principles”
achieved canonical status by escaping most people’s notice, avoiding any
“single decisive moment at which the conflict between the text and the
principles became too stark to ignore.” 214 But as Strauss admits, on his theory
there’s much that’s puzzling about Americans’ persistent claims to adhere to
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the original Constitution. 215 The persistence of these claims is part of what
motivates our belief in original-law originalism.
We also worry that, judged in Hartian terms, Strauss’s claims have more
plausibility from the external perspective than they do from the internal one.
For example, Strauss may turn out to be right, as an external and historical
matter, that “people gradually got accustomed to the idea that there should
be no established churches in the states and to the steady expansion of the
franchise,” and that they eventually “read[] those principles back into the
Constitution.” 216 But as an internal account of our system’s legal rules, even
Strauss recognizes that this whatever-we-get-used-to amendment process is
rather alien; the common law method is “not [one] we usually associate with
a written constitution, or indeed with codified law of any kind.” 217
Similarly, Strauss argues that courts are sometimes bound by original
content, as it’d be “lawless” to disregard rules that a recent amendment was
understood to adopt (though such disregard, he argues, is “routinely
accepted” for older amendments). 218 But the idea that rules added by
amendment carry a built-in expiration date, after which it’ll be legal to fudge
things a little, is something no one in our system would describe as a rule of
constitutional law. (It does not, for example, seem to have affected the
Emoluments Clause.) We might all notice the relaxed treatment of older
rules, but we notice it from an external perspective, as a claim about our legal
practice rather than of it. That is not how participants in our legal practice
justify constitutional drift. Indeed, what differentiates original-law
originalism from pure textualism or strict constructionism is the ability to
easily account for doctrines of precedent and practice in legal terms.
A different practice-based theory of “principled positivism” has
recently been proposed by Professor Mitchell Berman. 219 Berman argues that
our tradition of legal argument rests constitutional claims on certain
principles, such as “[w]hat the text meant to those who ratified it has great
force,” 220 “[w]hat the Supreme Court has held possesses great legal force,” 221
“[g]overnment must respect the inherent equal dignity of each person within
its jurisdiction, and must not demean or stigmatize people,” 222 “[p]olicy
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preferences of a majority of the people are to be respected,”223 and many
more. This makes Berman’s theory a particularly advanced form of
constitutional pluralism. And unlike most forms of pluralism, Berman’s
theory is of special interest because it recognizes the need for a legal
framework, itself supported by practice, for weighing these principles
against one another. This is necessary to yielding a constitutional law that
can actually decide cases rather than merely make soup. 224
But the very framework that ascribes particular weights to these
principles (and that would give “principled positivism” its coherence) makes
us doubt that this is the most natural account of our official story. We are not
convinced that our legal practitioners engage in a process that looks like
weighing, and even if they do, we are not convinced that any particular
assignment of weights can be derived from our practice. Indeed, such a
theory would likely require “reject[ing] . . . the Hartian account of law” in
favor of a novel account of positivist jurisprudence. 225 Further treatment of
Berman’s theory may have to await his and our future work, but these
empirical and jurisprudential gaps seem large to us.
Still, we are no more convinced by other forms of constitutional
pluralism, whether they involve many modalities or even just two (such as
“originalism, but also precedent, even when the two conflict”). What these
theories have in common is their claim that originalism is at most only part
of our law. They therefore raise the question: which part?
A pluralist theory needs some method of resolving conflicts among its
various modalities, or else it lacks any coherent “truthmaker.” 226 We find
either option hard to swallow as an account of our legal practice. On the one
hand, the difficulties in establishing Berman’s principled positivism would
also apply to any competing pluralist formula. On the other, the claim that
we simply have no law on the topic seems implausible as well.
One might be tempted to double down on the latter by simply denying
that our system actually has any constitutional law, at least as to contested
Supreme Court cases and the like. 227 With no law to govern those decisions,
as Professor Brian Leiter has suggested, the Court would be more of a
“super-legislature” of limited jurisdiction—restricted to “issues that are
223
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brought before it” and nonetheless “constrained, to some extent, by its past
decisions and by constitutional and legislative texts.” 228
But if the Supreme Court really is a super-legislature, its members have
some odd preferences regarding their policy agenda.229 The Justices largely
control their own docket and calendar. Yet instead of acting like normal
legislators and addressing salient topics like tax rates or gas prices, 230 the
Justices instead possess an extensive desire to meddle around in federal
sentencing, 231 an outsized and politically unpredictable interest in the details
of criminal procedure, 232 and an abiding fascination with Internet
pornography. 233 (The eminent biologist J.B.S. Haldane, when asked what
he’d learned through his career of the mind of the Creator, suggested “[a]n
inordinate fondness for beetles.” 234)
We think there are other reasons why these topics, and not others, are
thought appropriate for Supreme Court intervention—and that those reasons
have a great deal to do with the official story of our legal system. And within
these topics, it’s at least as plausible that our system is one in which the Court
is legally supposed to do its best to determine the law, and its determinations
merely seem legislative in hard cases because those are the ones in which no
knock-down legal arguments can be mounted against either view. 235 The nolaw view is not simply the null hypothesis, but another positivist claim that
must be proved, and that we think has yet to be proven.
CONCLUSION
We believe we’ve put forward the best account of the official story of
constitutional law. But if our case isn’t yet proven, the same positivist
228
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premises can be used to judge other competing accounts of constitutional
law. It takes a theory to beat a theory, in the following sense: either
originalism is our law, or something else is, or nothing is. To be sure, each
of the authors discussed above is aware of the possible points, and each has
his answers. But our point here is just to remind readers that one shouldn’t
judge positivist originalism in a vacuum. Even if our account requires one to
make some inferences from the evidence we see to the bigger picture we
present, we submit that those leaps are smaller than the leaps over text and
conventional jurisprudence required by our best rivals.
What makes a method of legal interpretation correct, in our legal
system, is a multilevel question—one that ultimately depends, at different
levels, on both modern practice and original law. As we see it, the
relationship between past and present is this:
•
•
•

As a theoretical matter, positivists like us figure out today’s law
based on today’s social facts.
As a contingent, empirical matter, today’s social facts happen to
incorporate the Founders’ law by reference.
As a historical, legal matter, the Founders’ law allowed for various
kinds of changes, including both formal enactments and the
incorporation by reference of various kinds of customary law.

As a result, it’s possible and even common for the law to require one or
two levels of recursion. A given rule of law may be a function of whatever
the custom is today, because that’s what the Founders’ law prescribed back
then, which is what our law tells us to care about today. We believe that this
system, though occasionally complex, in fact gives the best available account
of how the law of the modern United States relates to the law of the past.
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